

Political tolerance in Eastern and Western Europe: Social and psychological roots

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Abstract

According to Sullivan et al.'s (Sullivan et al. 1979, 53-55, Sullivan et al. 1985) theory, social and psychological factors play different roles in political tolerance. Target-group selection is shaped by socio-demographic characteristics, since in this way people try to adjust themselves to their social environment. On the other side, the degree of tolerance is a function of personality and other psychological factors.

The paper examines whether the causal model proposed by Sullivan and his co-workers is able to account for individual differences in the degree of political intolerance in Eastern and Western Europe. The main emphasis is on their hypothesis about different effects of socio-economic and psychological variables. The research is based on World Values Survey data, which include the so called 'least liked' method to operationalize political tolerance. The findings indicate that psychological factors play an important role in the *choice* of target group, and not only in determining the degree of intolerance, contrary to Sullivan et al., hypothesis. Socio-economic status variables displayed rather complex pattern of influence on political tolerance. In general, the findings suggest that intolerance of different groups is not uniformly related to social and psychological explanatory variables. Not only intolerance is pluralistic, but the mechanisms behind intolerance seem to be pluralistic too.

Key words: political tolerance, social status, authoritarianism, Europe

Introduction

Political tolerance is widely regarded as one of the basic values of a democratic society. Since consensus is achievable only in a narrow range of issues, citizens of democratic societies must permanently live side by side with people who question their political values. Whether one argues from the point of view of individual freedom or is just looking for a pragmatic solution to the dilemmas of pluralism, tolerance appears as a cornerstone-value of the ideal political community.

Political tolerance is, at the same time, a fundamentally controversial value. Freedom of political action is repeatedly used in order to undermine democratic order. The rhetoric and actions of political organizations often hurt the personal dignity of citizens and threaten the stability of the political regime. Even the most tolerant societies restrict the freedom of action of political groups, and the boundaries of freedom are permanently contested.

Due to its relevance and inherent ambiguity, political tolerance is a favorite topic of social research since the 1950's. The early studies (Stouffer, 1955; Prothro and Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964) evidenced a considerable opposition against granting civil rights to Communists, atheists and Socialists in the United States in spite of rather wide acceptance of the general norms of democracy (esp. Prothro and Grigg, 1960). Later optimistic findings of the increasing political tolerance in the USA were criticized on methodological grounds (e.g., Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979), leading some researchers to conclude that "political tolerance is a scarce commodity in the United States" (Gibson, 1989, p. 567).

Research in the post-Communist context revealed even darker picture – surveys have had a hard time to determine even several percentages of politically tolerant individuals (e.g., Bahry, Boaz and Gordon, 1997; Enyedi and Todosijević 2001b; Gibson, 1997; Gibson and Duch, 1993; for a different view see Kaprov, 1999). In light of the evidence that East Europeans are considerably intolerant, it is very important to examine the sources of the individual-level political intolerance in different political contexts.

Since the very beginning of the empirical studies on political tolerance, scholars were interested in explanatory accounts. Stouffer (1955), for example, found that education, generation and age are the most important factors influencing intolerance. According to Sullivan et al.'s (e.g., 1982) model, the hypothetical causal chain starts with various indicators of socio-demographic background, such as education, age, religion, and occupational status. The next stage is represented by general ideological orientations (e.g., 'conservatism') and psychological or personality traits (in their case labelled as "psychological security", 1982, p. 213). These two sets of variables influence such political characteristics of the respondents as political involvement and sophistication. Finally, the perceived threat posed by the target group and the acceptance of democratic norms are the causal variables closest to the explanandum, i. e. the degree of intolerance expressed against the most disliked group.

Sullivan et al.'s methodological innovation, namely separation of the intensity of intolerance from the choice of a group towards which intolerance is directed, required two separate explanations. One dealing with the target group selection, and the other dealing with the intensity of intolerance. According to Sullivan et al. (1979), socio-demographic characteristics shape the target-group selection since in this way people try to adjust themselves to their social environment. On the other side, the degree of tolerance is "largely a function of externalization and object appraisal", i.e., "individual's level of intolerance will be a direct function of personality and cognitive political factors and not of social factors" (Sullivan et al. 1979: 53-55). Shamir and Sullivan (1983) comparative study on US and Israel showed that the relative importance of social and psychological variables is constant across these two cultures, while the differences are found in the role of the intervening political variables. The authors reported similar findings after comparing the USA, Israel and New Zealand (Sullivan et al., 1985).

In the present analysis, we examine whether the causal model proposed by Sullivan and his co-workers is able to account for individual differences in the degree of political intolerance in Eastern and Western Europe. The main emphasis is on their hypothesis about different effects of socio-economic and psychological variables, both on target group selection and on the level of intolerance.

Data suitable for such a comparative research are available thanks to the project *World Values Survey* (WVS). WVS data include a version of Sullivan et al.'s (1979, 1982) "least liked group" measure of political intolerance, and various socio-demographic and socio-psychological variables that could be used to address the aforementioned problem.

Several studies have recently been published that make use of the WVS data to study political tolerance (Guérin, Petry i Crête 2004, Marquardt-Pyatt & Paxton 2007, Peffley & Rohrschneider 2003). These works deal with different theoretical problems. Marquardt-Pyatt & Paxton (2007) and Peffley & Rohrschneider (2003) examine the impact of learning process onto political tolerance, while Guérin and coworkers (2004) analyze the influence of experience with concrete political activities (e.g., participation in political protests) on the degree of tolerance. So, the present research differs both according to the main theoretical problem and various methodological solutions.¹

Compared with previous comparative studies (Guérin, Petry & Crête 2004, Marquardt-Pyatt & Paxton 2007, Peffley & Rohrschneider 2003, Shamir & Sullivan 1983), the present one is based on larger number of cases. The included countries are, however, not analyzed individually, but classified as Eastern and Western European countries. This division has explicit theoretical rationale when dealing with political tolerance. Fort of all, it has been shown that the length of democratic experience has important consequences for political tolerance (Marquardt-Pyatt & Paxton 2007). By comparing the results for the 'two Europes', we therefore take into account the experience with political pluralism and democratic regime, while individual specificities of the included countries, which do not stem from the post-World War 2 political history, are kept in background.

In addition to the already well-established finding that the level of tolerance is higher in Western Europe, we have several general expectations, which are based on presumed differences in political contexts in the two regions. First, it seems safe to assume that West European countries have a more homogeneous political culture facilitated by the post-WW2 history, and the development of the EU. As a result, there should be more tendencies observable in the aggregated sample. Furthermore, given the more structured political life, including the relationship between preferences and social structure (e.g., Gijstbers and Nieuwbeerta 2000), we expect findings closer to those reported by Sullivan and his coworkers, which are also based on countries with more democratic experience than is common for Eastern Europe.

In Eastern Europe, socio-economic status is less clearly associated with specific political preferences, i.e., is less articulated politically, so status differences may be more consequential for the intensity of ones attitudes, including tolerance, rather than for the kind of attitudes one holds. For instance, lower status may be simply associated with increased frustration, and therefore with the intensity of intolerance, rather than with coherent political outlook which would predict which groups are not to be tolerated.

¹ Because of methodological differences even the basis descriptive findings differ. One of the problems, for instance, even in works that explicitly deal with post-communist countries, is that some countries end up dropped from the analysis, or that analysis is based on federal states when focus on federal units would be more appropriate. Guérin et al., for example, excluded Albania, and analyzed Serbia and Montenegro as a single case – Yugoslavia. Marquardt-Pyatt and Paxton analyze Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single sample. There are also instances where data weighting is either not reported or conducted inappropriately.

Political preferences, on the other side, may be more related to psychological factors. For instance, authoritarianism seems associated with political attitudes and preferences in various Eastern European countries (McFarland et al., 1996, Todosijević, 2008). In addition, given the absence or weakness of the norm of tolerance, intolerant attitudes are likely to be freely expressed regardless of one's psychological dispositions. Thus, this reasoning would imply that in Eastern Europe, tendencies may be opposite of those predicted by Sullivan et al.'s model: psychological factors may be more associated with the target group selection, and structural factors more with the intensity of intolerant attitudes.

Method

The research is based on data from the World Values Survey (WVS, available at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>), which include a version of Sullivan et al.'s (1979, 1982) "least liked" operationalization of political intolerance. The analysis includes samples from 30 European countries², and USA as a relevant referent case, especially when dealing with political variables. The following samples belong to the East European group: (year of survey in parentheses): Albania (1998), Azerbaijan (1997), Byelorussia (1996), Bulgaria (1997), Montenegro (1996), Czech Republic (1998), Estonia (1996), Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998), Georgia (1996), Croatia (1996), Armenia (1997), Latvia (1996), Lithuania (1997), Hungary (1998), Macedonia (1998), Moldavia (1996), Poland (1997), Republika Srpska (1998), Romania (1998), Russia (1995), Slovakia (1998), Slovenia (1995), Serbia (1996), Ukraine (1996). West European samples: Finland (1996), Germany (Eastern) (1997), Germany (Western) (1997), Spain (1995), Switzerland (1996), Sweden (1996).

WVS data, with some exceptions, are based on national random samples. WVS module that included Sullivan's measure of political tolerance was applied between 1995 and 1998. More details about the variables included in the analyses are given at the appropriate places in further text.

Method of the "least liked" group, and political tolerance index

According to the method applied in the WVS, respondents are first asked to choose which group from a predetermined list they like least. The lists are not identical in all samples, but certain groups are listed in most or all of the samples, what enables comparative analysis. The following groups are mentioned in most of the WVS samples: Jews, Capitalists, Stalinists/Hardcore Communists, Immigrants, Homosexuals, Criminals, Neonazis/Extreme rightists, and Anarchists/Terrorists. Roma (Gypsies) appear in 5 samples. Category "Other" includes various groups with typically low frequencies.³

Table 1 shows the distribution of responses concerning the least liked group. Criminals are the most often selected group in majority of the samples, particularly in Eastern Europe (42.4% compared to 17.3% in Western Europe). It seems that criminals are less often seen as a political problem or as political actors in Western Europe. Neonazis are the second most-often selected group in the total

² Not all samples represent countries – in several cases samples represent federal units.

³ However, in several samples, this group has the highest frequency. In the Spanish sample, all respondents from the "Other" category (72.3%) are respondents who chose "ETA terrorists". In the Swedish sample, 40.3% out of this category refer to racists, 18.9% concern "non-Christian fundamentalists", and 5% "Christian fundamentalists". In Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, category "other" refers to Serbs, while in Republika Srpska to Muslims (Bosniaks). In several places, WVS documentation incorrectly states that Serbs are one of the groups mentioned in questionnaires on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Copies of the original questionnaires show that questionnaire administered in Republika Srpska refers to Muslims.

sample, but most often selected in Western Europe. Further difference between the regions concerns Stalinists/Hard-core communists – they are less frequently selected in Western Europe. The remaining groups appear with lower frequencies. It is clear that political history of the two regions has its imprint on which groups are particularly disliked.

Table 1 Choice of the least liked group in Eastern and Western Europe

	Eastern Europe*	Western Europe*	Total
	%	%	%
Jews	.7	2.5	1.2
Capitalists	3.7	3.9	4.0
Stalinists / Communists ^a	10.6	6.0	9.6
Immigrants ^b	3.3	2.1	3.6
Homosexuals	5.4	2.1	5.1
Criminals	42.4	17.3	37.4
Neonazis / Extreme right	23.2	45.4	27.2
Anarchists / Terrorists	4.9	.6	4.6
Gypsies	2.6		1.7
Other	3.2	20.1	5.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: *Weighted for equal representation of each country sample.

There are several problems with the “least liked” method as applied in the WVS surveys, especially concerning the groups mentioned on the lists. First of all, it is clear that groups differ in their political status. Some of the groups, such as criminals or even capitalists, typically do not appear as political actors. Moreover criminals typically have their political rights legally restricted. Legal restrictions also apply to neo-Nazi organizations in many countries as well. For this reason, a number of authors who analyzed the WVS data opted to completely exclude respondents who selected criminals (e.g., Guérin, Petry i Crête 2004, Marquardt-Pyatt i Paxton 2007). The problem with such a solution is that it in fact excludes majority of respondents in a number of samples (e.g., three quarters in Albania). If respondents are selected according to a variable that is in the focus of analysis, it is impossible to determine the generalizability of the findings. Therefore, in order to secure interpretable and generalizable findings, the following analyses are based on all respondents with valid answers. Although the political character of intolerance defined in this way is problematic, it should be kept in mind that the questions that follow the target group selection are explicitly political.

After selecting the least liked group, respondents are asked the following three civil liberties questions:

Whether to allow the least liked group to 1. Hold public office; 2. Teach in schools; 3. Hold public demonstrations.

Table 2 displays distribution of positive answers to the three civil liberties questions. The three activities differ in their acceptability. Public demonstrations seems to be the most acceptable – on average, some 10% of the respondents would allow the least liked group to hold public demonstrations. Teaching in schools, or holding public office are activities that respondents are more likely to restrict.

Table 2 Tolerance of political activities of the least liked group in Eastern and Western Europe

Would allow the least liked group to:		Eastern Europe*	Western Europe*	Total*
E193	Hold public office	3.40	6.93	4.19
E194	Teach in schools	4.43	6.52	4.93
E195	Hold public demonstrations	7.36	17.38	9.75

* Weighted for equal representation of each country sample (weight *s018a*).

As already reported in literature (e.g., Marquardt-Pyatt i Paxton 2007) political tolerance is clearly associated with the length of democratic experience. Yet, the proportion of tolerant responses is not impressive in any of the regions.

Political tolerance index is defined as the mean on the three civil liberties items (where affirmative answer is coded 1, and negative answer is coded 0). Respondent who answered affirmatively to all three items obtained score 1, respondent with two affirmative answers obtained score .67, and so forth. In order to preserve the number of valid answers, respondents who had at least two valid answers were included in the analyses. Distribution of the intolerance index is given in Table 3.

Table 3 Political tolerance index in Eastern and Western Europe

	Eastern Europe	Western Europe
Low tolerance .00	89.5%	79.7%
.33	6.8%	12.5%
.50	.6%	.9%
.67	1.8%	3.7%
High tolerance 1.00	1.3%	3.2%
	100%	100%
Mean	.05	.10
Standard error ^a	.005 ^a	.018 ^a

Notes: Weighted for equal representation of each country sample. East-West difference is statistically significant ($p < .001$). ^aLinearized standard error (calculation method incorporates the design effect - countries as clusters; Stata procedure *svy:means*).

Political tolerance, in this way defined, is not a common attitude neither in Western nor in Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe, almost 90% of respondents would not allow any of the three activities to their disliked groups. Similar level of intolerance is found among 80% of Western European respondents.

The purpose of these descriptive findings is to provide an insight into the applied method. The highly skewed distribution of the tolerance index has important consequences for the further analyses.

Results

Socio-demographic characteristics and political intolerance

Socio-demographic characteristics and target group selection

In order to examine the influence of socio-demographic characteristics (SES) onto the target group selection, we used discriminant analysis, separately for the two regions. The analysis includes the following variables: Age, gender, education, social class self-assessment, income, level of urbanization, and three indicators of religiosity.

Two discriminant functions proved significant in each of the regional samples (Table 4). The association between SES and the target group selection is stronger in Western Europe ($R_c=.36$), than in Eastern Europe ($R_c=.17$). Structure of the discriminant functions is rather similar in the two regions (details not shown). One of the functions is defined primarily by the indicators of religiosity, and the other by socio-economic status variables.

The general conclusion seems clear: social status indicators are associated with the target group selection, according to Sullivan et al.'s hypothesis, and less strongly in the East, according to our expectation.

Table 4 Socio-economic status and target group selection: Discriminant analysis

		Canonical correlation	Chi-square	df	p
East*	Function 1	.17	651.7	72	.000
	Function 2	.12	333.3	56	.000
West*	Function 1	.36	517.0	63	.000
	Function 2	.11	99.3	48	.000

Note: *Weighted for equal representation of each country sample.

Direct quantitative comparison of the discriminant functions obtained in the two regions is difficult because the corresponding functions are not identical. In order to construct comparable dimensions, indicators that load the two functions, i.e., religiosity and status indicators, are rescaled as principal components. In this way we constructed separate measures of religiosity and status, which are, on the one side, based on the discriminant analysis results, and on the other suitable for comparative analysis (Table 5). In other words, this overcomes idiosyncrasy of discriminant analysis functions, and secures a kind of metric invariance.

Religiosity dimension is defined by high loadings of the three religiosity indicators, in a very similar way in both samples. SES dimension is defined by the level of education (the highest loading in both samples), high income, younger age, social class self-assessment, and the level of urbanization (the lowest loading in both samples). SES and religiosity dimensions, defined in this way, are moderately negatively correlated (using the total sample $r=-.17$, $p<.01$).

Table 5 Religiosity and socio-economic status (principal components)

	East*	West*
<i>Religiosity</i>		
A006 Religion important in life	.83	.88
F028 How often do you attend religious services	.82	.84
F034 Religiosity (self-assessment)	.82	.82
<i>Socio-economic status</i>		
X003 Age	-.56	-.37
X025 Highest educational level attained	.73	.77
X045 Social class (self-assessment) ^a	-.61	-.73
X047 Income	.59	.66
X049 Size of town	.44	.18

Note: *Weighted for equal representation of each country sample. Variable Gender (X001) not included in the analysis because of zero loading on both components. ^aHigher score means lower social class.

The influence of these composite variables onto the target groups selection is best seen using graphical presentation of average scores on these dimensions obtained by respondents that selected different

groups (Figures 1-3). The figures are based on scores calculated separately for each region in order to keep the axes centered at zero, i.e., to make the graphs directly comparable.⁴

Figure 1 shows the results for Eastern Europe. As it was clear from the low canonical correlation coefficients, concentration of the groups around the center of the diagram implies that SES and religiosity are rather weak in discriminating the Eastern European respondents that dislike different groups. Communists and immigrants are disliked by respondents somewhat higher in status and religiosity, while the opposite is true for those who dislike capitalists and Romas. Religiosity coupled with lower SES is specific for Eastern Europeans who particularly dislike Jews and Anarchists. Higher status and secular orientation are specific for respondents who dislike Neonazis. In spite of these tendencies, it is clear that the association between socio-demographic indicators and the target group selection is weak in this region.




Figure 1 Socio-demographic characteristics and target group selection - Eastern Europe

Figure 2 demonstrates that the dispersion of the target groups in the two dimensional space is more pronounced in Western Europe. It is important to note that the main discriminatory axis is the

⁴ For this reason, we performed factor analyses separately on each regional sample.

dimension of religiosity. Intolerance on the secular side is quite focused – on Neonazis. Religious segment of the Western European public is quite divided concerning the most disliked groups. Higher status religious westerners direct their intolerance towards Jews, capitalists, communists, and immigrants. Homosexuals are particularly disliked by the less well-off religious respondents. Criminals are selected by the more religious respondents, but this selection is unrelated to status. The choice of anarchists is unrelated to these two dimensions.




Figure 2 Socio-demographic characteristics and target group selection - Western Europe

Two conclusions seem to be warranted by the findings obtained thus far: position in social structure is important for the choice of the most disliked group, but the association between these variables is not uniform. In West European countries, religious dimension is decisive for the choice of the target group. In Eastern Europe, there is not much difference in the influence of the two dimensions, primarily because the influence of both dimensions is rather weak.

Certain of the findings appear in both regions, so they perhaps represent more general tendencies. For instance, religiosity is associated with intolerance towards Jews in both regions, while secular

orientation is associated with the dislike of neonazis. Communists are particularly disliked by higher-status and religious respondents in both regions.

SES and the degree of tolerance

The degree of political tolerance is also significantly associated with the socio-demographic variables. Table 6 presents results of regression analysis in the two regions of Europe, with political tolerance index as the dependent variable. Note that in this and the following regression equations, all variables are standardized, so it is possible to compare the coefficients both across the regions and across the variables.

The association between the SES predictors and the degree of tolerance is significant, but rather modest in magnitude. The association is stronger in Western Europe, as expected. In this region, the model explains approximately 8% of variance in the degree of intolerance, while in the East, the explained variance is below 1 percent.

Table 6 Sociological model of the degree of intolerance

	East*		West*	
	b	p	b	p
A006 Religion important in life ^a	.02	.105	-.07	.005
F028 How often do you attend religious services ^a	.00	.907	.03	.205
F034 Religiosity (self-assessment) ^a	.00	.763	-.02	.519
X003 Age	-.03	.051	-.01	.454
X025 Highest educational level attained	.04	.004	.23	.021
X045 Social class (self-assessment) ^a	-.01	.184	.02	.423
X047 Income	.02	.161	.10	.040
X049 Size of town	.02	.105	.12	.000
X001 Gender (Female)	-.06	.003	-.15	.005
R ²	.009		.077	
P (F test)	.000		.000	

Note: Dependent variable: Political tolerance index. All variables are standardized except for variable Gender which is dichotomous.

* Weighted for equal representation of each country sample; Linearized standard error (calculation method incorporates the design effect - countries as clusters).

^a Higher score means lower social class and lower religiosity.

In Eastern Europe, significant predictors are education (better-educated are more tolerant), gender (women appear less tolerant), and to a certain degree age (younger respondents are more tolerant). However, the association is very weak, and the model explains hardly one percent of variance. In Western Europe, in addition to education (the highest coefficient), significant effects are observed for gender, level of urbanization, income, and religiosity. Higher subjective importance of religion is associated with higher degree of tolerance here, which is an unusual finding. These findings are in line with Sullivan et al.'s model – SES variables appear to be poor predictors of the degree of political tolerance.

Socio-psychological variables and political tolerance

The selection of socio-psychological variables to be included in the analysis is limited by what is available in the WVS data. It proved possible to assemble a set of socio-psychological variables that include general value orientations (materialism-post materialism), attitudes towards child upbringing

(liberal and authoritarian educational attitudes), and political attitudes and orientations (national pride, democratic orientation, political authoritarianism, ideological self-assessment).

Post-materialism index (*y001*) is one of the composite variables constructed by the authors of the WVS study. This index is based on 12 items, aimed at operationalization of post-materialist versus materialist value orientation (Inglehart 1971, 1977). According to Inglehart, second half of the twentieth century witnessed a large-scale cultural change in developed, primarily West European countries, the so-called post-materialist transformation. According to this view, because of increasing material well-being and security, accessible education, absence of wars, an increasing number of people has been turning towards the post-materialist values (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1990). This means decreasing valuation of such central modern values as material standard of living, social order, national security and military strength. Values that are increasingly valued are, for instance, environmental protection, civil liberties, especially for various minorities, and self-actualization on personal level. The first set of values Inglehart termed materialist values, and the second as post-materialist values. This dimension, according to Inglehart, represents increasingly important social, political, and ideological cleavage.⁵ Implications from Inglehart's model, even from this brief presentation, are clear: post-materialist orientation should be positively associated with political tolerance, especially concerning the traditionally underprivileged minority groups.

Educational or child-upbringing attitudes are certainly important psychological indicators, and were included into the definition of the authoritarian personality already by Adorno et al. (1950). The present measures are also close to Baumrind's definition of parenting styles, which have various and diverse psychological implications (Baumrind 1966, 1991). Using the WVS data, it is possible to construct two indicators of educational attitudes: authoritarian and libertarian educational attitudes. Authoritarian educational attitude is defined as the average score based on five questions about which traits respondents think are important to develop in children. The following traits are included: good manners, hard work, thrift saving money and things, religious faith, and obedience (variables *a027*, *a030*, *a038*, *a040*, and *a042*).⁶ Liberal upbringing attitude was defined by the average score on 4 questions about the importance of the following traits: independence, feeling of responsibility, imagination, and determination perseverance (items *a029*, *a032*, *a034*, and *a039*).⁷ Hypotheses that follow from the concepts defined in this way are also clear: the authoritarian upbringing attitude should correlate with intolerance, and liberal attitude should have the opposite effect (see for example, Altemeyer, 1988).

Political authoritarianism is defined as the average score based on three items dealing with characteristics of a good political system: Having a strong leader, Having the army rule, and Having a democratic political system (*e114*, *e116* and *e117*, respectively) (the last item is formulated in the opposite direction). The expectation is that political authoritarianism is associated with intolerance, especially towards traditionally underprivileged groups (cf. Adorno et al., 1950).

Ideological self-assessment or left-right self-placement (*e033*) is included in order to capture the general political-ideological orientation. This is a standard 10-degree self-placement scale, where higher score denotes right-wing identification. This disposition is expected to have stronger effect on

⁵ Empirical results are not, however, unequivocal. Easterlin and Crimmins (1991), for instance, report that during the 1970s and 1980s, values among the West European youth were changing – but in the direction of greater personal materialism and away from personal self-fulfillment.

⁶ The average was calculated if at least 4 out of 5 variables had valid codes.

⁷ The average was calculated if at least 3 out of 4 variables had valid codes.

the target group selection than on the intensity of intolerance. East-West differences are also expected to be significant because of different political history of the regions.

National pride, as one of the central components of nationalist orientation (Dekker i Malova, 1997), is expected to influence tolerance, especially towards ethnic groups. This variable is defined by a simple item asking whether respondent is proud to belong to his/her own nation (*g006*).

Democratic orientation is operationalized by the average score on three items dealing with the general attitude towards democratic political regime. The first statement says "Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling" (*e121*). Item *e122* states: "Democracies aren't good at maintaining order." Item *e123*: "Democracy may have problems but is better than any other system." The items are recoded so that the higher score means stronger pro-democratic orientation. Democratic orientation is expected to influence broader social outlook, and to lead towards higher political tolerance (and possibly towards lower tolerance towards the groups that reject democratic political order), which would be in accordance with Sullivan et al.'s causal model (1982).

Socio-psychological variables and target group selection

According to Sullivan et al.'s theory, psychological and ideological variables should primarily be associated with the degree of tolerance. Their influence onto which groups the intolerance is directed to should be smaller. The results of discriminant analysis, where socio-psychological variables are predictors, and target groups choice is the criterion, show that this aspect of their theory is not supported, neither in Western Europe, nor in the East European sample (Table 7). Moreover, the association with the socio-psychological variables is stronger than with the SES variables, reported previously.

As in the previous analyses, two discriminant functions with significant effects are extracted in both regions. Differences in the structure of these functions between the two regions are, however, larger than in the case of SES variables, so direct quantitative comparison between them is not possible.

The degree of association is again lower in Eastern Europe ($R_c=.29$) than in the West ($R_c=.41$). The first function in the Eastern European sample is defined by high scores on authoritarianism measures, and on right-wing identification, while the opposite pole is defined by post-materialist orientation and liberal upbringing attitude. Hence, this function could be summarized as authoritarianism vs. post-materialism.

The second function is defined by democratic orientation and right-wing identification. This appears to be an Eastern European ideological peculiarity. In Western Europe, these attitudes (post-materialism, liberal upbringing attitudes) are typically associated with right-wing identification (e.g., Middendorp, 1992). In brief, this dimension could be interpreted as the pro-democratic, liberal right.

The aforementioned ideological peculiarity of the East is highlighted by the structure of the first discriminant function obtained in West European sample. In this sample, right-wing orientation goes together with political and educational authoritarianism, and with national pride, while the opposite extreme is defined by democratic orientation, post-materialism, and liberal educational attitudes.

The second function isolated in Western Europe combines post-materialism and nationalism on the one extreme, and left-wing identification on the other. Although this is a somewhat unusual configuration, various combinations of nationalist and post-materialist attitudes have been observed previously (e.g.,

Inglehart 1971, Curry and O’Connel, 2000).⁸ The observed rather strong association between post-materialism and authoritarianism in both samples supports Flanagan’s interpretation of post-materialism as a component of a more general orientation of authoritarianism versus libertarianism (Flanagan, 1987).

Table 7 Socio-psychological variables and target group selection: Discriminant analysis

	East*		West*	
	F1	F2	F1	F2
Post-materialism	-.71	.17	-.55	.40
Authoritarian educational attitude	.56	-.11	.64	.13
Political authoritarianism	.52	-.49	.49	.06
Liberal educational attitude	-.40	.15	-.43	.14
National pride	.33	-.02	.70	.48
Ideological self-assessment (Left-Right)	.44	.75	.54	-.59
Democratic orientation	-.27	.64	-.33	-.11
Canonical correlation	.29	.20	.41	.16
Chi-square	3136.8	1302.8	982.8	175.3
Degrees of freedom	56	42	79	36
<i>P</i> (df)	.000	.000	.000	.000

Note: *Weighted for equal representation of each country sample.

The relationships between the obtained discriminant functions and selected least like groups, are shown in the following three figures (figures 4, 5, i 6). In Eastern Europe (Figure 4), authoritarianism vs. post-materialism dimension differentiates respondents who dislike Neonazis (higher post-materialism score, lower authoritarianism score), from the respondents who selected the other groups. The second dimension divides those who do not tolerate Stalinists from respondents who dislike capitalists, the remaining groups being in-between. So, anti-Stalinists are characterized by pro-democratic and relatively right-wing orientation, while anti-capitalists are ideologically centrist, and more critical towards democracy.

Just as in the case of SES variables, socio-psychological variables are better in differentiating the least liked group selection in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe (Figure 5). Low scores on the first function, i.e., post-materialism and liberal orientation, are specific for intolerance towards neonazis. Intolerance of the respondents with the opposite characteristics (authoritarianism, nationalism, right-wing) is divided between several objects in interaction with the second dimension. Authoritarianism, nationalism and right-wing identification are specific for intolerance towards immigrants and homosexuals, and in combination with high scores on the second dimension towards Jews. Strong right-wing orientation and authoritarianism are found among those who dislike communists.

⁸ Inglehart (1971) explained the relatively pronounced post-materialism among Belgian nationalist as an expression of the need to belong, which is a “higher” need in Maslow’s hierarchy. Similar findings have been reported for Northern Ireland, where higher post-materialism was the highest among Sinn Fein sympathizers, despite their relatively lower material standard (Curry and O’Connel, 2000).




Figure 4 Socio-psychological characteristics and the target group selection - Eastern Europe

The second function, with average scores on the first function, discriminates those who are intolerant towards capitalists (pronounced nationalism and post-materialism) from the intolerance of anarchists and communists (right-wing orientation and materialism). The findings for Western Europe, are, therefore, not surprising, but they once again demonstrate that in post-modern era, nationalism can be found combined with values of both the classical left and right.




Figure 5 Socio-psychological characteristics and the target group selection – Western Europe

Socio-psychological variables and degree of intolerance

Socio-psychological variables, at least those included into the WVS data, proved better predictors of the target group selection than expected according to Sullivan et al.'s hypothesis. However, these variables proved weak predictors of the *degree* of intolerance. Table 8, showing the results of multiple regression analysis, demonstrates that the socio-psychological model can explain a rather small proportion of variance in political tolerance. Like in the previous analyses, the association is stronger in Western Europe, where the socio-psychological model can explain approximately 4% of variance. The most influential predictor variables are post-materialism, democratic orientation, right-wing identification, and, marginally, liberal and authoritarian upbringing attitudes (the latter in negative direction).

Table 8 Socio-psychological model of the degree of intolerance

	East*		West*	
	b	p	B	p
Post-materialism	.07	.000	.12	.001
Political authoritarianism	-.01	.721	-.09	.116
Authoritarian educational attitude	-.01	.319	-.06	.055
Liberal educational attitude	.01	.603	.06	.034
Ideological self-assessment (Left-Right)	.02	.031	.07	.019
Democratic orientation	-.02	.180	.13	.000
National pride	-.05	.000	.08	.121
R ²	.010		.044	
p (F test)	.000		.000	

Note: Dependent variable: Political tolerance index. All variables are standardized. *Weighted for equal representation of each country sample; Linearized standard error (calculation method incorporates the design effect - countries as clusters).

There are even fewer significant predictors in the sample from Eastern Europe. Post-materialist value orientation and right-wing identification predict tolerance also in the East. In addition, national pride tends to reduce tolerance in Eastern Europe. In general, it seems that tolerance defined via the 'least liked' method is associated with right-wing identification in both regions. Obviously, tolerance has different correlated than prejudice (Gibson 2006).

Integrated model of the degree of intolerance

In order to assess the relative contribution of the SES and socio-psychological factors, both sets of variables are entered into regression equation, with political tolerance index as the dependent variable. Results for the two regions are shown in Table 9. Although the regression equation is significant in both regions, the proportion of explained variance is quite low in both cases, especially in Eastern Europe ($R^2=.02$). In Western Europe, the coefficient is approximately four times higher, but still rather modest ($R^2=.09$). Thus, it seems difficult to explain political tolerance defined by Sullivan et al.'s "least liked" method using the socio-psychological and SES variables available in the WVS data set. The variance explained seems quite lower than reported by the original authors (Shamir i Sullivan, 1983).

There are few variables with direct influence on the degree of tolerance in Eastern Europe. Among the demographic variables, these include education and gender. Among the socio-psychological variables, post-materialism exhibits the strongest influence, while the national pride and liberal educational attitude effects are on the border of statistical significance.

In Western Europe, there are more variables with significant effects, especially in the group of SES predictors, contrary to Sullivan et al.'s model. Education has the strongest effect, but gender, urbanization, income and religiosity are influential as well. Significant socio-psychological predictors are post-materialism, and both liberal and authoritarian educational attitudes. It is interesting that the later two coefficients are both in positive direction, which contradicts the common-sense expectations. First, it is possible that this is a statistical artifact – both coefficients are rather low, and are not reaching statistical significance at $p<.01$ level. On the other hand, it is possible that both educational attitudes contribute to political tolerance, but towards different groups.

Table 9 The integrated model: SES and socio-psychological predictors of political tolerance

	East*		West*	
	<i>b</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>p</i>
Religion important in life ^a	.03	.173	-.07	.008
How often do you attend religious services ^a	.02	.366	.03	.186
Religiosity (self-assessment) ^a	-.02	.145	-.03	.487
Age	-.03	.078	-.01	.362
Highest educational level attained	.03	.017	.19	.017
Social class (self-assessment)	.00	.890	.02	.118
Income	.02	.077	.09	.021
Size of town	.00	.849	.10	.000
Gender (Female)	-.05	.029	-.14	.009
Post-materialism	.07	.000	.11	.006
Political authoritarianism	-.02	.451	-.10	.073
Authoritarian educational attitude	.02	.157	.01	.016
Liberal educational attitude	.03	.026	.03	.035
Ideological self-assessment (Left-Right)	.01	.263	.01	.783
Democratic orientation	-.03	.096	.06	.164
National pride	-.04	.013	.06	.222
R ²	.02	.000	.09	.000

Notes: Dependent variable: Political tolerance index. All variables are standardized, except for variable *Gender* which is dichotomous. *Weighted for equal representation of each country sample; Linearized standard error (calculation method incorporates the design effect - countries as clusters).

^a Higher score means lower religiosity.

Overall, variables that are significant predictors in both regions, such as gender, liberal childrearing attitude, exhibit the effects in the same direction. Higher SES seems favorable for political tolerance. Most of the obtained associations support this generalization, although the pattern is clearer in Western Europe.

We also obtained that many of the standard tolerance predictors proved statistically insignificant. For instance, effects of political authoritarianism or ideological identification are below statistical significance.⁹ On the other side, some of the findings contradict Sullivan et al.'s model – the lack of the association with age, or very weak association with religiosity. The major departure from the expectations, however, is the difference between the effects of SES and socio-psychological variables. The theoretical model predicts that the latter set of variables should have stronger effect on the degree of intolerance. The findings show the opposite tendency – the effect of SES seems stronger.

In order to get some insight into the variations within both regions, Table 10 presents the integrated model using individual samples from several Eastern and Western European countries. Sweden and West Germany are taken as illustrative examples from Western Europe, and Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czech Republic from Eastern Europe.

The first finding to be noticed is higher percentage of explained variance in Sweden and Germany, and insignificant equations in Bulgaria and Czech Republic. The findings from Sweden are similar to the

⁹ A similar finding concerning authoritarianism was reported for Hungarian respondents by Todosijević and Enyedi (2002).

findings for the Western Europe in general: significant effects are observed for gender, democratic orientation, national pride (negative direction), and education, while post-materialism is below statistical significance. In Germany, in addition to gender, education increases tolerance as well as the general democratic orientation, while religiosity works in the opposite direction.

Table 10 The integrated model of political tolerance: Examples

	Sweden		West Germany		Hungary		Bulgaria		Czech Republic	
	b	p	b	p	b	p	b	p	b	p
Religion important in life ^a	-.005	.956	-.061	.320	-.093	.133	.004	.936	-.029	.683
How often do you attend religious services ^a	.023	.769	-.039	.509	.112	.081	.067	.223	.030	.653
Religiosity (self-assessment) ^a	-.043	.505	.098	.052	.065	.250	-.056	.236	-.044	.369
Age	-.042	.495	.022	.659	-.018	.726	-.043	.342	-.037	.464
Highest educational level attained	.140	.046	.107	.037	.068	.227	.028	.569	-.054	.368
Social class (self-assessment)	-.069	.278	.011	.840	-.046	.470	.105	.046	-.012	.846
Income	-.064	.352	-.031	.513			.042	.358	.007	.905
Size of town			.008	.878	-.064	.248	.059	.213		
Gender (Female)	-.555	.000	-.372	.000	-.252	.010	-.166	.051	-.264	.004
Post-materialism	.114	.070	-.004	.932	-.045	.439	.051	.268	-.036	.479
Political authoritarianism	-.107	.148	.111	.133	.024	.675	-.018	.708	.019	.750
Authoritarian educational attitude	-.075	.392	-.026	.730	-.054	.391	.021	.707	-.122	.025
Liberal educational attitude	.035	.658	.092	.150	-.105	.101	.040	.388	-.034	.545
Ideological self-assessment (Left-Right)	.023	.704	-.011	.847	.166	.001	-.031	.440	.042	.341
Democratic orientation	.145	.035	.221	.000	.040	.367	.022	.594	.035	.540
National pride	-.147	.031	-.067	.179	-.014	.816	.002	.957	-.040	.451
R ²	.12		.08		.06		.03	n.s.	.03	n.s.

Notes: Dependent variable: Political tolerance index. All variables are standardized, except for variable *Gender* which is dichotomous. Empty cell means the corresponding variable is not available.

^a Higher score means lower religiosity.

There are very few significant effects in Eastern European samples. In Hungary, left ideological identification means lower tolerance. This is the only significant association, in addition to generally significant effect of gender.¹⁰ Bulgarian data show two coefficients on the border of statistical significance, although the equation in total is insignificant. Lower social class self-assessment is weakly associated with tolerance, while the association with gender is in the same direction as in the other samples. In Czech Republic, two coefficients reached statistical significance, although the total equation is also below the significance level. The significant coefficients concern gender (once again) and the authoritarian child-rearing attitude

The analyzed individual West European samples show, just as the entire Western sample, that education increases tolerance. The same association was also visible when the Eastern European sample is analyzed as a whole, but not in the analyzed individual samples. It is also interesting to note that although the democratic orientation is not associated with tolerance when the total sample is

¹⁰ In a previously reported study on an independent Hungarian national sample, somewhat broader set of explanatory variables was able to explain approximately 12% of variance in the degree of tolerance, measured also by the “least liked” method (Todosijević & Enyedi, 2002). The difference from the present finding could partly be explained by a more extensive set of explanatory variables, and probably by different groups offered to respondents to chose from.

analyzed, the association proved significant in both Swedish and West German samples. This shows that the connection between general democratic norms and their application to specific groups actually exists in some contexts.

The lack of significant relationships in the East European sample does not seem to be a consequence of the heterogeneity across the individual country-samples so that the relationships get cancelled out in the aggregated regional sample. The discussed individual cases, and the analysis of the other East European cases not reported here, testify that the main cause is the absence or weakness of the relationships on the level of individual samples. Nonetheless, the few observed significant relationships are generally in theoretically expected direction, but the difficulty in modeling political tolerance is undoubtful.

Discussion

The obtained results clearly show that both SES and psychological and ideological variables influence which groups will be selected as the least liked. It proved not only that social status is important for the target group selection, but also that this association is not uniform across different samples. In West European countries, religiosity seems to be decisive for the group selection. Intolerance of the secular part of the population is focused on neonazis, while intolerance of the religious is divided. In Eastern Europe, religiosity and socio-economic variables do not differ much in their influence, primarily because the discriminativity of both dimensions is rather weak.

Some of the findings are constant across the two regions, so they seem to represent tendencies that are more general. For instance, religiosity and intolerance toward Jews, or secular orientation and intolerance towards neonazis belong to this kind of relationships. Likewise, intolerance of communists is also generally in the quadrant of higher status and higher religiosity.

One of the more intriguing findings is that women proved more inclined toward political intolerance. This is in accordance with some previous research (Golebiowska, 1999), although different findings have been reported as well. Sotelo (1999), for example, reports about higher tolerance among girls. Some of the existing analyses of the WVS data also report this gender difference, but typically do not discuss it (e.g., Marquardt-Pyatt and Paxton 2007). Guerin et al. (2004) offered an ad hoc hypothesis that lower tolerance among women might be a consequence of their lower political activism. Since the gender differences appear as the most consistent finding in the present analyses, their explanation demands more explicit theoretical foundation. One possible explanation could be based on gender differences in normative philosophies. According to Carol Gilligan and her revision of Kohlberg's theory of morality (Gilligan, 1982), women look at moral questions more emotionally, while males are more inclined towards rational-formal rules. Since tolerance defined via Sullivan et al.'s index seems based more on rational and consistent application of the abstract norm of tolerance, it is possible that this is the reason that females appeared somewhat less tolerant.

Among the socio-psychological variables, the strongest influence was exhibited by post-materialist (PM) orientation, both in the East and in the West (though not in all individual country-samples). In some previous studies, post-materialism appeared as a construct with rather weak predictive power concerning the explanation of various political attitudes, values, and prejudice in Eastern Europe, especially when compared with authoritarianism (Enyedi and Todosijević, 2000). The present findings show the opposite tendency: the three indicators of authoritarianism are generally weaker and less consistent predictors of tolerance than PM orientation. This could probably be explained with reference to fundamentally ideological understanding of political tolerance in Europe. Authoritarianism is virtually universal predictor of various ideological orientations (e.g., Middendorp, 1991, Meloen

1993), but particularly with reference to right-wing ideologies.¹¹ On the other side, post-materialism is conceived as orthogonal in relation to traditional left-right divide (Inglehart 1984).¹²

Since Sullivan et al.'s *ideologically neutral* tolerance index by its very definition does not differentiate the objects of intolerance according to their ideological tendency, ideologically biased predictors, as authoritarianism is, are not able to explain much variance in the degree of intolerance. Ideologically less biased construct of post-materialism, thereby, demonstrates its explanatory power. Thus, political tolerance seems to be one of the areas where PM orientation really does have stronger explanatory power compared with authoritarianism, although this power remains rather small.

The authoritarian disposition, both political and one expressed through upbringing attitudes, still belongs among the more influential variables, which is in accordance with some previous studies (Altemeyer, 1988, Duckitt and Farre, 1994, Weldon, 2006, Todosijević and Enyedi, 2002). Moreover, authoritarianism functions in a similar way in both regions – groups opposed to democratic regime, primarily neonazis, provoke intolerance of anti-authoritarian respondents. Minorities, such as Roma, homosexuals, and to a certain extend Jews, are targets of intolerance among respondents with higher scores on discriminant functions that involve authoritarian variables.

One of the basic differences between Eastern and Western Europe seems to be in the functioning of ideological identification, but also in tolerance of communists and capitalists. Left-wing ideological identification in Western Europe, as often reported, correlates with pro-democratic orientation. In Eastern Europe during the mid-1990s, the relationship was in the opposite direction.

Thus, the choice of the object of political intolerance has its roots in social structure, as Sullivan et al.'s hypothesis argue, but the obtained results show that the contribution of the socio-psychological variables is not smaller. This, however, is not a peculiarity of the so-called young democracies, as it has been argued (Kende, 2001, Todosijević and Enyedi, 2002). According to this hypothesis, relatively unimpressive effects of the SES variables compared to the psychological variables is interpreted as the consequence of still fluid social structure in Eastern Europe, where political divisions only partly overlap with social cleavages. This research proved that these tendencies are even more pronounced in Western Europe. It is also possible that the difference might be a consequence of better quality of data collection in the West, since virtually all tendencies are more clearly delineated in the Western samples.

Relatively weak tendencies observed in Eastern European samples could also be a consequence of heterogeneity of this group of countries. This work, however, deals with general tendencies that could be observed in the two regions, intentionally overlooking specificities of individual countries.

In general terms, SES and socio-psychological variables are approximately equally strong predictors of the degree of intolerance. One might say equally weak predictors as well. To a large extent, however, this may be also a methodological problem. Measurement of intolerance using the "least liked group" method results in a variable that has a rather limited variability. As shown in the introductory analyses, there are only several percentages of respondents characterized as politically tolerant in any of the samples. If a variable has so limited variance, it is not surprising that it is difficult to find variables that would be better predictors. Todosijević and Enyedi (2002), for example, compared causal models when intolerance was defined via the "least liked" method and using items presented in standard Likert format. In the later case, the same set of predictors showed a considerably stronger

¹¹ The concept of authoritarianism was developed in order to explain individual susceptibility to fascist ideology (Adorno et al., 1950).

¹² Later research showed certain affinity between post-materialist orientation and political left, in the direction of the so-called 'new left' (Flanagan 1987).

influence. The standard attitudinal format, however, does not have the normative foundation that the “least liked” method has, and is therefore conceptually inferior.

The small proportion of explained variance in the degree of intolerance across different samples is probably also a consequence of psychological heterogeneity of the roots of intolerance. The effects of different predictors depend on which target groups are selected. A measure that neglects these differences is difficult for statistical modeling because different predictors may cancel each other out. For instance, both the authoritarian and liberal educational attitudes increase tolerance – but towards different groups. A single and ideologically neutral tolerance index disregards these differences, and therefore the proportion of variance explained remains low, and the effects of individual predictors almost nonexistent.

Having in mind the psychological heterogeneity of intolerance, it seems that the explanatory models of intolerance should also be heterogeneous. It is clear that in many countries predictors of intolerance towards neonazis are different from predictors of intolerance towards communists (Todosijević and Enyedi, 2002). This outcome could be interpreted as a weakness of the Sullivan et al.'s operationalization. However, other measures of intolerance do not have the adequate normative foundation. Hence, it is difficult to justify them as measures of general intolerance rather than as ideologically biased indicators. Likewise, ideologically biased definitions of intolerance would make it difficult to develop a more general explanatory account, which would not be specific for a particular culture, or for different ideological groups within a certain culture.

Conclusion

Since the fall of the Berlin wall, democracy seems to have become virtually a global ideal of a desirable political regime (demonstrated also by the WVS data, Guérin et al., 2004). Yet, political intolerance of specific groups, and for most Europeans it does not seem to be difficult to find such a group, does not seem less universal.

Although the level of tolerance in Europe may seem pessimistic, this research resulted in a number of theoretically important findings. First of all, we also obtained that the target group selection is associated with both SES and socio-psychological variables. However, contrary to Sullivan et al.'s hypothesis, socio-psychological variables are not less important predictors of the choice of the least liked group compared to the socio-demographic variables. Discriminant functions where authoritarian disposition have high loading differentiate respondents who dislike neonazis in virtually entire Europe, for instance. Equally contrary to Sullivan et al.'s theory, socio-demographic variables do not show much smaller effect onto the degree of intolerance, as it is clear in the combined model. It is true that the influence of the entire set of included variables is not impressive, but the pattern of the significant effects does not support their model. The present results support our earlier findings, obtained using a different Hungarian sample, that Sullivan et al.'s theory about different roots of target group selection and the degree of intolerance often disagrees with data (Todosijević and Enyedi, 2002).

Although it is important conceptually to define political tolerance with reference to groups that one dislikes, it is also clear that explanation of individual differences in intolerance is not independent of the chosen target groups (cf. Gibson, 1992, Todosijević and Enyedi, 2002). Value orientations, ideological identification, and authoritarianism have substantive influence not only on the degree of intolerance, but also on the choice of groups whose political liberties should be restricted. In other words, the influence of psychological factors is already built-in into the political tolerance index. Thus, for instance, authoritarianism is often associated with the choice of homosexuals as the least liked group, and negatively associated with the choice of neonazis. It is not surprising, therefore, that authoritarianism does not correlate with a measure that unites so psychologically different attitudes.

The outlined portrait of political tolerance may be specific for cultures where intolerance is not focused on specific clearly defined social groups, i.e., where society is not clearly segmented according to

social or ethnic criteria (Todosijević and Enyedi, 2002). In societies that are more homogeneous in this sense, the selection of political enemies is probably not determined so much by socialization in primary social groups as by values, ideological orientations, and other psychological dispositions. This could explain the differences between the present findings and those reported by Sullivan and his coworkers for the USA and Israel. Their theory could represent a special case, applicable to societies deeply divided according to ethnic or racial lines. If some of the present samples had included comparable groups, both in the list of the disliked groups offered to respondents, and their members among the respondent (e.g., Albanians in Serbia), the findings might have been closer to Sullivan et al.'s model.

The general conclusion, which seems applicable equally to the Western and Eastern Europe, states that there is no substantive difference between the mechanisms that determine the group selection and the intensity of intolerance – in both cases SES and socio-psychological variables are relevant. In societies where intolerance is pluralistic, it seems that explanatory models also have to be pluralistic. A general model, which would be able to explain individual differences in the degree of tolerance, would have to somehow control for the character of groups whose liberties are to be restricted. On the macro level, it is clear that the experience of democratic pluralism increases the general level of tolerance, but there is little evidence of the existence of the generally tolerant personality type.

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